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                                                                 ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the inter-related effects of foreign aid, control of corruption and 
governance on the development of Sub-Saharan African countries. The study examines how 
corruption influences the effect that infrastructural and total foreign aid have on social and 
economic development in this part of Africa. This study employs the fixed effect regression 
quantitative model to analyze the impact of foreign aid on corruption and socio-economic 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries between 2002 and 2014. The results of this study 
shows that contrary to expectation, infrastructural aid is uncorrelated with corruption except when 
there is a governance measure such as regulatory quality and democracy. Similarly, the results 
show that the effect of total foreign aid and infrastructural aid on health expenditure (social 
development) is reduced as control of corruption increases, but showed no effect on GDP annual 
growth (an indicator of economic development). 
In conclusion, this study shows that foreign aid leads to increased health spending in high 
corruption countries, thereby making funds more susceptible for embezzlement by officials 
through corruption. 
 Keywords: Total foreign aid, infrastructural aid, control of corruption, governance 
measures, total health expenditure (social development), GDP annual growth (economic 
development); Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
Although foreign aid has been linked to social and economic development in countries such as 
China and India, most African countries have made relatively little progress in reducing poverty 
despite a substantial amount of aid (Besley & Burgess, 2007). It is estimated that between 1956 
and 2006, the total amount of foreign aid disbursed to developing countries, including Sub-Saharan 
African countries totaled over $2.3 trillion dollars. For the African continent, over $568 billion 
dollars of the total amount of aid during this fifty years period are recorded to have been distributed 
to this region (OECD, 2006; Easterly, 2006a; Powell & Ryan, 2006; Easterly, 2007b).   
Grounded in the big push theory (Abuzeid, 2009), foreign aid has been promoted as a solution 
to African poverty and weak socio-economic growth. According to the theory, financial assistance 
in the form of development aid is necessary to foster economic, social, human resource and 
technological development and ultimately poverty reduction. This is because foreign aid provides 
investments in health, education, social services, business development, and infrastructure deemed 
necessary to create sustainable and growing economies based on stable employment, healthy levels 
of trade and rule of law (Francois & Sud, 2006). Foreign support is a core explanation behind the 
disbursement of foreign aid and assistance to African countries. The ‘big push’ model1 is still 
widely accepted by foreign donors and other western nations as the key way in which Africa can 
be raised from its current state of economic and social instability and under-development to the 
position of a developed region (Easterly, 2005; 2007; Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Bilateral donors2 
such as France and United States, as well as multilateral donors3 such as the World Bank and IMF, 
have continued to provide large amounts of official development assistance (ODA) of over $1.53 
billion dollars to African nations between 2005 and 2015 (OECD, 2016). Yet, despite the huge 
amount of foreign aid assistance released to the Sub-Saharan African region, there are no 
significant levels of development in some parts of the region and poverty levels remain high 
                                                 
1 The Big Push Model is the notion that holds that developing countries do need a huge support from external 
donors to improve development. This is a widely-believed notion by Economists and foreign donors like DAC 
(Easterly, 2005)   
2 Bilateral aid donors are any donor agency that provides country-to-country aid. Bilateral donors are members of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – World Bank, 2016 
3 Multilateral aid donors are organisations that acquire their funding from government of different countries and 
allocate these funds on projects in different countries based on their needs (OECD, 2016) 
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throughout most of Africa. Generally, socio-economic development will be referred to as the 
positive and stabilized increase in each and every social and economic development indicators 
represented and identified in each country. For the purpose of this study however, socio-economic 
development is defined as the positive and stabilized increase in the GDP annual growth, health 
spending and increase in the control of corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Several studies have argued that foreign aid is a major factor in undermining effective 
governance which in turn limits or undermines the positive effects of foreign aid on socio-
economic development (Fritz & Menocal, 2007; Moyo, 2009; Riddell, 2009). In the same vein, 
past research argues that the slow progress of socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan 
African countries is the result of weak governance environments which consequently leads to 
corruption (Englund, 2002; Karklins, 2005; Anten, et al, 2012). More specifically, research 
identifies corruption4 by the government and weak governance5 mechanisms for preventing 
corruption as among the central impediments to development aid impact on growth and 
development (Solli, 2011; Kjaer, 2013). However, relatively few researchers have focused on the 
combined impact of foreign aid and corruption on socio-economic development. Accordingly, this 
study uses a time-series approach covering 2002 and 2014 to analyse the interacting relationship 
between foreign support and corruption, effective governance and the socio-economic 
development in Africa.  
The analysis looks first at whether increasing foreign aid contributes to positive socio-
economic development in Sub-Saharan African countries within the context of weak or effective 
governance measures. Second, emphasis is placed on understanding if levels of corruption 
moderate the effect of foreign aid on socio-economic development. Third, the investigation also 
examines the extent to which infrastructure aid contributes to corruption, and whether levels of 
corruption mediate the effect of infrastructure aid on socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. I argue that an increase in foreign support is not the core reason for the 
downward progress of Africa’s development, but rather it is corruption and the laxity in the 
                                                 
4 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime defined corruption as the perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” 
of the state by elites and private interests (UNODC, 2014). Similarly, Transparency International defines corruption 
as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (TI, 2015). Of note is the emphasis on ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power or public power for private gain’ in both definitions of corruption. 
5 Weak governance for the sake of the current study refers to the lack of control by the government to ensure 
lawfulness in the nation and in the discharge of assigned national duties 
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governance environment and lack of an effective deterrence policy6 on corruption that is the core 
reason why foreign support has not yielded the anticipated result on African countries’ 
development. Past researchers have argued that weak governance environment and lack of 
deterrence policy create rooms for opportunist behaviours, and abuse of public office for private 
gain (Brantingham, 2008; Clarke & Felson, 2010; Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012). To better theorize 
this relationship, the study adopts an opportunity perspective7 of corruption to explain the laxity 
in African’s governance environment8. The opportunity perspective of corruption describes the 
rent-seeking behaviour that is perpetrated by taking advantage of the opportunities obtainable in 
weak governance environments. 
The initial thesis was that corruption and poor governance would combine to reduce the 
impact of foreign aid on development. However, the relationship between corruption, governance, 
and foreign aid impact on socio-economic development is much more complex than a simple 
corruption reduces the impact of foreign aid. This does not mean that regulatory quality and control 
of corruption is not important and necessary in the socio-economic development of Sub-Saharan 
African countries (Birdsall, et al. 2010; MENA Report, 2014). 
To contribute to the enhancement of Africa’s development, I seek to better understand the 
relationship among foreign support, corruption, and development in Africa, as well as the 
governance environment under which social and economic affairs are controlled and managed. 
1.2 Statement of problem 
According to the Corruption Perception Index (2016), up to four African countries made it 
to the list of ten most corrupt countries in the world based on perception indexes with a mid-point 
of 0, indicating highly corrupt and a score of 100, indicating very clean. Most African countries 
indexes around the globe average a score of 43 which indicates the presence of endemic corruption 
(Transparency International, 2016). 
                                                 
6 Deterrence policy refers to strategies and laws established that are effective to prevent corrupt and illegal 
practices. The deterrent effect will be to constrain any act of corruption by adopting punishable measures against 
those found culpable (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) 
7 Opportunity perspective of corruption explains the opportunities available for rent seeking behavior or corrupt 
acts and whether this behavior is illegal or not punishable within a context. See Graycar & Sidebottom (2012) 
8 Governance environment varies across various national contexts. Legal system and institutional strategies are 
some of the features of governance environment 
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Past research has identified corruption as one of the difficulties that has negatively affected 
socio-economic development in Africa.  The literature indicates that regulatory quality, lack of 
accountability, ineffective rule of law, private controls over foreign aid spending and corruption 
are the most recurring factors having negative impacts on social and economic development in 
Africa (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Nourou, 2014; Lgbaekemen, et al. 2014). Hence, corrupt 
behaviour is enabled by the weak governance environments in which these government officials 
operate.   
Research also suggests that foreign aid in a well-governed environment with good policies 
can result in better results from foreign aid. Conversely, there is evidence that recipient countries 
with poor policies and governance environments inhibit the impact of foreign aid (Burnside & 
Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2001, 2002; Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Lgbaekemen, et al. 2014). 
For example, Moyo (2009) explains that foreign aid has not only been ineffective in supporting 
the economic growth in African countries, but that it has exposed Africa’s leadership, the 
government and the system at large to corruption due to the lack of credibility (see also Dunning, 
2004; Nielsen, 2013). Since most official development assistance disbursed to Africa is often 
released on ineffective terms, it makes it easier for the disbursed funds to be syphoned through 
corruption and ultimately destroys the power of free enterprise by making African countries aid 
dependent9 for a larger percent of their future budget (Moyo, 2009; Weylandt, 2013). 
Foreign Aid 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines foreign 
aid10 as government aid which is designed to promote the economic development and welfare of 
                                                 
9 Aid dependence is when aid recipient countries essentially rely on foreign aid allocation as the national revenue 
and capital to run the state’s social, economic and political activities. Aid dependence is believed to weaken 
governance and institutional policies (Knack, 2001) 
10 Foreign aid takes on different forms and each of these forms are released based on varying purpose and 
expected outcome. The different forms of foreign aid include but not limited to bilateral aid, and multilateral aid. 
Bilateral aid is the form of aid given by one government, usually a government of a developed country to another 
government (usually of a developing country) to foster sustainable socio-economic development. This form of aid 
is to support stability and promote democracy in the recipient countries. Multilateral aid on the other hand is aid 
provided by a group of governments who contributes funds to global organizations like the United Nations and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is then distributed to governments of developing countries like the Sub-
Saharan African countries to reduce poverty. This can take the form of food aid. 
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developing countries, including financial flows, technical assistance and commodities (OECD, 
2017; Radelet, 2006). Foreign aid can be provided bilaterally which is direct disbursement from 
donor to the recipient countries or can be directed through multilateral development agencies such 
as the World Bank or United Nations (OECD, 2017). One cannot totally displace the fact that 
global concerns have been centred on the improvement of human welfare, social and economic 
development. This is because well-established strategies have been put in place by bilateral and 
multilateral development aid actors such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, World Bank, World Health Organisation, United Nations, world leaders, and 
governments of developed countries interested in supporting global world development. 
Nonetheless, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD DAC and other bilateral aid donor countries do 
not provide or distribute foreign aid out of an absolute act of benevolence, and, much of the aid in 
the form of development aid is distributed to create access to foreign natural resources especially 
from the recipient countries (Mc Lean, 2012). While the development literature points to many 
problems with development aid and its effects on developing country economies (Brautigam and 
Knack, 2004; McLean, 2012), this study is concerned with the role that corruption plays in 
undermining the potentially positive effects of aid.   
The importance of a society with fair and firm socio-economic development is evident in the fact 
that five of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals11 (SDGs) are directed at poverty 
reduction (SDG1), quality education (SDG4), decent work and economic growth (SDG8), 
industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG9) and sustainable cities and communities (SDG11) 
– (United Nations Summit, 2015). Although, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are 
intended to be applied universally, it is not surprising that the goals of sustainable development12 
which includes both social and economic development are mostly emphasized towards developing 
countries and emerging economies like the ones seen in Africa.  
Corruption and the Effects of Foreign Aid 
  High dependence on foreign aid has been found to have a negative correlation on social 
development in Africa (Nourou, 2014). In Nourou’s view, a high aid dependence increases 
                                                 
11 The Sustainable Development Goals is a set of 17 global goal, having a total of 169 targets between the 17 goals 
(United Nations Summit, 2015) 
12 Sustainable development was first defined in 1987 by the Brundtland Commission as the “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. 
See Kates, et al. (2005) 
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inequality by encouraging corruption and the rent seeking behaviour13 of some government 
officials to take advantage of this foreign support (Nourou, 2014). Related to Nourou’s view is 
Okada & Samreth’s (2012) argument that states that governance and institutional power in aid 
recipient countries is critical in determining a robust positive relationship between aid and 
development in recipient countries. 
Interestingly, foreign aid allocation to developing countries does to an extent involve a 
reprocessing procedure in which aid allocation is used to purchase the services and or products 
such as food from the donor countries. However, some foreign aid does come in the form of 
political and military support pledged to the aid recipient countries. But, the foreign aid that is 
most likely to drive corruption is foreign aid disbursed in the form of financial resources, either in 
direct money given or in the form of loans towards infrastructural development (Colombatto, 2003; 
Moyo, 2009; Platteau, et al. 2003). One of the obvious problems of foreign aid is known to be the 
impediments in the arrangement and conditions of foreign aid allocation. Some of these 
impediments involve diplomacy, foreign services and products from donor countries and their 
inability to effectively monitor the governance credibility of recipient countries (Dunning, 2004; 
Nielsen, 2013).  
Take for instance the case of Chinese aid and the Sub-Saharan African countries. There is 
evidence of commercial diplomatic interest on the part of China in its infrastructure aid14 to the 
Sub-Saharan African nations (Zafar, 2007). It is argued that China’s quest for natural resources 
and industrialization is made known in the allocation of infrastructure aid to African countries and 
in turn exporting African’s natural resources (e.g., oil, and copper) to expand China’s economy. 
The above explanation makes it easy to conclude that the provision of foreign aid by developed 
nations, like China to developing countries is partly to create a vulnerable channel through which 
natural resources from developing countries can be exported to China. China as a major donor 
nation to the Sub-Saharan African nations is explicitly concerned with the natural resources 
exported from these vulnerable poor nations more than providing the support for the accountable 
use of the allocated infrastructure aid for the development of appropriate sectors (Zafar, 2007; 
Moyo, 2009; Hilson & Maconachie, 2009). Likewise, China has been identified to have a high aid 
                                                 
13 Rent seeking behaviour is characterised by abusing one’s public/political position or power to convert public 
resources and funds into personal use, mostly at the detriment of the welfare of the state or public (Nourou, 2014) 
14 Infrastructure aid is a part of foreign aid for investment in infrastructure projects in recipient countries (OECD, 
2016) 
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contribution and investment up to over $ 107 billion dollars in 2008 towards Africa’s 
infrastructural development. However, it has been argued that China’s dealings with African 
countries in aid and diplomatic relations are characterized by a less intrusive approach, with 
ineffective controls for credibility (Yin & Vaschetto, 2011). This suggests that the type of foreign 
aid does matter, and that part of the problem about foreign aid leading to corruption is because 
some forms of aid like the infrastructure aid allocated by China offers more opportunity for corrupt 
practices (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Radelet, 2006; Moyo, 2009). 
Ugur & Dasgupta (2011) argued that corruption15 is a symptom and a result of institutional 
weakness, with unfavourable effects on a country’s economic performance. In recent times, 
scholars and policy makers have expressed concerns that corruption has proceeded together with 
extensive liberalisation reforms which had led to poorer economic outcomes, including sluggish 
growth and high levels of growth instability (Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011; Havrylyshyn, 2016).  
Other researchers (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005) found a negative correlation of foreign aid and 
socio-economic development. They argued that even when foreign aid is released to countries with 
sound policies and governance, there is still no evidence that aid positively impacts the 
development of recipient countries.  Simply put, development aid does not positively affect 
development even in contexts of good governance. Nevertheless, the bulk of the literature points 
to poor governance and corruption as important factors undermining aid’s impact. Hence, this 
study focuses on the problem of corruption that have arisen as a major concern to the effective 
impact of foreign aid on positive development in Sub-Saharan African countries and to report 
findings on the effects of foreign aid on development in cases where high governance measures 
are recorded.  
Central to the problem of corruption is the opportunity structures that are entrenched in 
some forms of foreign aid, alongside weak governance that enables corrupt officials to freely 
exhibit rent-seeking behaviour. This study draws on opportunity theory and the concept of 
opportunity structures using the work of Clarke & Felson (2010) and Graycar & Sidebottom (2012) 
in trying to explain the relationship between governance, corruption and aid impact. The problem 
of this study is thus focused around the opportunity formations of corrupt practices that are made 
                                                 
15 Corruption can also be a form of white collar crime. White collar crime is the crime motivated by financial 
personal gains that exists among holders of entrusted public office positions (Simpson, 2013) 
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possible in the presence of poor regulatory quality, ineffective institutional policies, and overall 
poor governance environment.  
 
A classical description of the problem of this study is the case of the European Union’s 
(EU) foreign aid to developing countries from the 1980s until the 2000s. Record shows that the 
highest fifteen EU aid recipient countries within 1988 and 1989 were African countries and that 
six of the highest EU aid recipient countries between 2008 and 2009 were Sub-Saharan African 
countries (Glennie, 2011). With the level of consistent EU aid allocation16 to African countries 
described by Glennie (2011), the question that appears pertinent to the problem of this study is 
‘Why do African countries still remain as developing countries despite foreign assistance from the 
European Union and other aid donors for consistent number of years?’ The probable answer to this 
question is the evidence found to support the opinion that the impact of foreign aid on development 
depends largely on the regulatory and institutional qualities of the recipient countries (Burnside & 
Dollar, 2000). Adopting popular measures of governance and institutional quality, Burnside and 
Dollar found that effective governance and institutional measures interacted with foreign aid does 
positively impact on development in recipient countries, thus, making it possible to understand 
that the problem around foreign aid and development is imbedded in the quality of state’s 
governance and institutional qualities (Burnside & Dollar, 2000).  
Take for instance the case of Nigeria, one of the countries in the Sub-Saharan region of 
Africa known for its weak governance and institutional policies and vast corrupt practices by 
government officials. Nigeria’s weak governance and institutional quality makes administrative 
corruption suitable for individual public office holders who abuse their political office and position 
to misuse national resources and demand bribes for private gain and interest (Shah & Schacter, 
2004; Fagbadebo, 2007). As expected, corruption is predicted to have harmful impacts on a 
country’s infrastructure and reduces the impact of aid allocation for development and alleviating 
poverty. Similarly, evidence of another effect of corruption on development is the complicity of 
foreign industries, private sectors and public office holders for shared benefit that consequently 
negatively impacts the effectiveness of foreign assistance on the economy (Shah & Schacter, 2004; 
Fagbadebo, 2007; World Bank, 2004). A specific example is the financial crime and oil scandal 
involving Shell Oil (Shell Petroleum). The oil scandal involved the release of up to 1.3 billion 
                                                 
16 See Foreign aid, p. 5 
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euros to a convicted money launderer17 by Shell Group in a bid to possess more oil fields in 
Nigeria. It is alleged that some of this money acquired through corrupt means are buried in grave 
yards and hidden in private apartments of culpable government officials rather than being 
circulated in the economy to improve the current social and economic state in Nigeria (Akinola, 
2008; Ajie & Wokekoro, 2012; Ukanwa, 2015).  
1.3 Objectives and Research Questions 
Key findings in past research have recognized that forms of foreign aid like infrastructural 
aid matter in determining the increase in the levels of corrupt opportunity or rent-seeking 
behaviours in aid recipient countries (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Radelet 2006; Moyo, 2009). In 
addition, corruption or rent-seeking behaviour and poor weak governance have been found to 
influence the effect of any kind of foreign aid on development. Accordingly, the research questions 
and hypotheses that I address are: 
R1: Does infrastructure aid increase corruption in African countries?  
Hypothesis 1: Infrastructural aid will lead to increased corruption in African nations  
R2: Does corruption affect the impact of infrastructural aid on socio-economic development in 
African countries? 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of infrastructural aid on socio-economic development will be reduced in 
more corrupt governance environment. 
R3: Does corruption affect the impact of foreign aid on socio-economic development in African 
nations?  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of foreign aid on socio-economic development will be reduced in more 
corrupt governance environment. 
1.4 Social Relevance and Practical Importance 
The current study will investigate the inter-related effects of foreign support, governance 
and corruption on Africa’s social and economic development. Using core social and economic 
indicators like GDP annual growth, health expenditure and control of corruption, the current 
research seeks to contribute to the limited research that has been undertaken related to this 
important issue, specifically with emphasis on foreign aid and the recipients’ governance 
                                                 
17 A money launderer is someone who makes large sum of money through illegal means and tries to disguise that 
the source of the large sum of money is from legal and transparent transactions 
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environment (one that breeds corrupt practices) and how that has affected the socio-economic 
development efforts that have been directed to Africa.  
The results of the current study should be valuable in three ways. First, this study will 
contribute to the further understanding of how foreign aid impacts development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This will be of interest to aid agencies and donor nations to learn more about the links 
between developments and certain levels and types of foreign support. 
Second, the results of the current study will create awareness and understanding of the 
relationships between corruption, governance, foreign aid and development in Sub-Saharan 
African nations.  
Third, the result of the current study will identify whether specific forms of aid foster 
corruption. If some forms of foreign aid like the infrastructural aid, have been empirically 
established to be susceptible to rent-seeking behaviour from corrupt officials, donor countries will 
be able to put control measures around the allocation of such support and evidences of completed 
infrastructures will be actively monitored and evaluated within pre-specified duration. 
Similarly, the result of the current study will add to the reservoir of existing literature by 
providing empirical findings on foreign aid, and the potential impairment that corruption may have 
in realizing the actual effect of aid on development in African countries. Results from this study 
will create awareness on carrying out similar investigations in developing countries of different 
continents to ascertain whether the results are similar across different geographical areas with 
similar development state.  
1.5 Outline of study 
Along with the current introduction, the thesis is organized into five chapters. The next 
chapter assesses the existing literature and considers the different theoretical perspectives on the 
impact of foreign aid on corruption and socio-economic development in Africa. This includes 
discussion of the interacting effects of foreign aid and corruption on Africa’s socio-economic 
development, while examining the relationship of the governance environment to both corruption 
and development. Adopting the opportunity theoretical perspective, the second chapter provides 
in-depth insight on which my research study is drawn.   
Chapter three presents the measures and methods of data analysis adopted for this study.  
Using secondary development data, this study uses fixed-effects panel regression models to 
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analyze and report the findings on the impact of foreign aid and corruption on socio-economic 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Chapter four presents the data analysis for this study. The results derived from the data 
analysis are examined with reference to the hypotheses for this study.  
Chapter five discusses my findings in response to my research questions and hypotheses, 
as well as relating my findings to the significance of my study. Also, chapter five expounds on the 
conclusion of my research findings, limitations and suggestions for future studies. 
1.6 Summary 
In Chapter One of this thesis, the background of foreign aid, as well as the restraining 
impact of corruption and weak governance on development in Sub-Saharan African countries were 
briefly outlined. Additionally, this chapter points out that; although past research provides insights 
to some of the core findings on the relationship of foreign aid and socio-economic development, 
it does not examine whether weak governance in aid recipient countries leads to opportunity 
behaviours among public officials and politicians to misuse the available foreign resources for 
personal gain. In providing evidence to support the line of argument, this thesis adopts a 
quantitative approach to revisit the interacting impact of foreign aid, corruption and governance 
measures on socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
In the next chapter, I examine the literature on the effect of foreign aid on corruption and 
socio-economic development. This literature review includes the effect of both foreign aid and 
corruption on socio-economic development in Africa, and the African’s governance environment. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AID AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the research evidence on the relationship between foreign aid, 
development, and corruption in Africa as supported by literature. The chapter also identifies related 
findings based on the literature and opportunity theory of corruption which explains the 
relationship between foreign support, governance and corruption in Africa.  
2.1.0 Foreign Aid and its History in Africa  
The history of foreign aid can be traced back to the 1950s. During this period, foreign aid 
was largely characterized by military assistance during the first and second world wars 
(Lumsdaine, 1993; Kai, 2013) as well in the form of food aid because of the need for a world-wide 
sustenance after the Second World War. Of note in the history of foreign aid was the need for the 
rebuilding of the Western Europe after the world wars through the Marshall Plan18 (De Long & 
Eichengreen, 1991). The Marshall Plan was put in place to create financial investment strategies 
and to support the rebuilding of damaged economies and infrastructural facilities during the war. 
The World Bank, the International Monetary Funds (IMF), and the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) were core international organizations created to provide and facilitate foreign 
support after the Second World War. This was largely in the method of granting large amounts of 
capital in the form of loans and grants to encourage investments for the reconstruction needed after 
the outcome of the Second World War. This act of financial support for development and 
reconstruction to promote global development led to the history of foreign support in its different 
forms and dimensions to countries of the world including Sub-Saharan African nations (De Long 
& Eichengreen, 1991; Lumsdaine, 1993; Kai, 2013) 
In the 1950s, Africa entered a phase of change as western states loosened their colonial 
holds on the continent. This period witnessed the independence of up to thirty-one African 
countries, like Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi. However, their independence in this period 
depended on the amount of support that they could receive from the western bodies. Hence, foreign 
aid to Africa began from the inception of independence. Foreign aid from western donors then 
became a vital tool for national survival for many African nations. This period was also 
                                                 
18 The Marshall Plan was started in 1948 as an initiative by America to rebuild the Western Europe after the second 
world war (De Long, et al, 1991) 
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characterized by wars among African nations and the strength of most undefeated nations during 
the war depended on the benevolence of their western foreign support donors.  
In the 1960s, foreign aid to Africa moved away from the support of war to a more 
developmental focus, which has remained the core motive of foreign aid disbursement to this 
present day (De Long & Eichengreen, 1991; Hjertholm & White, 2000; Moyo, 2009). Although 
most African countries had their independence by this time, the continuation of post-colonial 
assistance and support after the war especially from France and Britain to their previous colonies 
characterized the role of foreign aid during this period (Hjertholm & White, 2000). The initial 
premise on which foreign aid was initiated was that Africa and other developing countries needed 
a ‘big push’ to support their development and to reduce poverty. 
2.1.1 The Big Push Theory  
The big push theory is one of the early models of analysis used by economists to explain 
how the national savings of poor countries is less than the demands for their survival. The big push 
theory is the notion that holds that any developing country needs support from external donors to 
promote its development (Easterly, 2005). African countries have been regarded as developing 
countries due to their social and economic status, especially since the average daily living in Africa 
is between $1.5 and $2 US dollars (World Poverty Statistics, 2016). In this view, poor countries 
like the African countries are assumed to need a huge foreign support or Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) as the means to close the poverty gap and to maintain sustainable social and 
economic systems.  
Easterly further explained the notion of the big push theory that the poor countries like many 
African countries are at the low level of development because of their poverty trap. He explained 
that the poverty trap is a consequence of the fact that the poor countries started poor and that only 
a big push in the form of foreign aid support will have a significant impact in promoting the 
developing countries to the stage of self-sustenance (Easterly, 2007).  In other words, the big push 
theory is the notion that African countries are unable to raise the capital that will propel a 
significant level of economic development without a big push from developed countries or donor 
countries who have attained vibrant and functioning social and economic systems.  
While the big push theory can be interpreted as propaganda justification for continued 
foreign control of African countries (Abuzeid, 2009; Ogundipe, et al. 2014), the value of big push 
theory in explaining how foreign aid leads to development has also been disputed by researchers 
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who argue that foreign aid big push does not guarantee the assumed growth in development 
(Alesisna & Weder, 2002; Abuzeid, 2009). Some researchers believe that bad governance and 
corruption19 in aid recipient countries could be the reason for the lack of effective aid impact on 
development and that more flow of foreign aid as the big push proponents theorize does not in any 
way have any significant influence on the development of poorer countries (Alesina & Weder, 
2002; Abuzeid, 2009). According to Abuzeid (2009), foreign aid has been dignified as an 
important method to end poverty in the world but argues that this may not be ostensibly correct. 
He argued that the invasion of enormous sum of funds given as foreign aid can have a more 
damaging influence on the recipient countries and their governance environment.  
2.2.0 Foreign Aid, Opportunity and Corruption in Africa 
A large portion of the existing literature tends to look at how foreign aid has functioned in 
recipient countries with poor corruption control and how that has impacted the effectiveness of 
foreign support on development (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Brautigam & 
Knack, 2004; Addison, et al. 2005; Abuzeid, 2009; Ogundipe, et al. 2014). While less attention 
has been paid to investigate the extent to which foreign support has manipulated weak governance 
measures and increased corruption in poor countries, past research has investigated the 
development of African nations across different time frames to determine how foreign support 
(official development assistance) has contributed to corruption in Africa rather than promoting 
development. Other previous studies have also investigated the effect of corruption on Africa’s 
development (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Ram, 2003; Hanlon, 2004; Werlin, 2005; Okada & 
Samreth, 2012). 
This literature has identified two different likely reinforcing sources of corruption, 
corruption from the donors based on their characteristics and corruption stemming from the 
characteristics of the recipient countries (Knack, 2001; Knack & Rahman, 2007; Moyo, 2009; 
Ahmed, 2014). However, it is important to note that there are variations and degrees of corruption 
and governance quality within the different countries in the Sub-Saharan African region. Take for 
instance the codes and rules of conduct in Angola which serve as guidelines for the performance 
expectations from public officials in the discharge of their political duties. These codes and rules 
                                                 
19 It will be noteworthy to know that there are other arguments about why big push does not work which has less 
to do with bad governance and corruption of the recipient countries and more to do with the power and interests 
of the donor countries and international institutions. Take for instance, export and debt traps (Abuzeid, 2009; 
Moyo, 2009). 
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of conduct clearly highlight accountability, transparency and fairness in dealing with the public 
and national resources in an attempt to curb corruption among the ruling elites. Despite the 
established codes of conduct in Angola, the proposed Anti-Corruption High Commission is yet to 
be established, therefore leaving cases of money laundering and corruption in the country 
uninvestigated (OSISA, 2017). South Africa is another Sub-Saharan African country with a 
different national approach to corruption. In the case of South Africa, there are established state 
institutions for the purpose of investigating corruption and ensuring that the rule of law prevails. 
In spite of the legislative power given to the anti-corruption state institutions, political officials 
found culpable and under investigation illegally attack the investigating institutions in order to 
prevent justice and rule of law from taking place (OSISA, 2017).  
Drawing on past research to explain the corruption characteristics of recipient countries, 
Knack (2001) and Anten, Briscoe & Mezzera (2012) explained that foreign aid dependency 
regardless of the type of aid serves to cover the incompetency of the recipient countries. Flaws in 
governance and socio-economic development are obscured by the huge amount of aid that is 
disbursed into the economic system. Public office holders and political elites are thus left to 
struggle over aid funds, leading to political and economic conflict instead of improving the 
political and economic state of recipient countries (Knack, 2001; Anten, Briscoe & Mezzera, 
2012). 
Some analysts argue that foreign aid agencies contribute to corruption, whether 
intentionally or not, by reinforcing their unending disbursement of foreign support to aid recipient 
countries with weak governance. What this means is that aid agencies contribute to corruption by 
reinforcing less transparent and accountable mechanisms for distributing, dealing and regulation 
of foreign aid (Hanlon, 2004). Hanlon’s analysis, which uses an opportunity-oriented perspective, 
shows that corruption is more likely to occur when donor countries do not consider the state of 
governance and accountability in their continuity in aid allocation to developing countries. Here, 
we see at play foreign funds disbursed by foreign donors into the economy for reasons of 
supporting development. But, the absence of accountability, transparency and scrutiny of how 
these funds are being executed, diminishes the extent to which foreign aid affects development 
(Maipose, 1999; Stiglitz, 2003; Graycar et. al. 2012). What this explanation reveals are first, the 
loopholes that are available in the phase of monopolized power in the management of a nation’s 
resources and foreign resources. Second, it reveals whether or not public office holders entrusted 
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with national resources and allocations take on their posts with an intended motive for corrupt 
practices. 
One question this raises is whether foreign aid in any form or capacity (e.g., infrastructural 
aid) affects corruption in aid recipient countries (Knack & Rahman, 2007; Anten, et al. 2012) or, 
whether its effectiveness is hindered and becomes uncertain in the presence of lax governing 
environment or an existing context of corruption which creates the opportunity for corrupt 
practices. 
Similarly, when aid recipient countries receive more than or the equivalence of their annual 
national gross domestic product as foreign support (especially in monetary form), it hinders the 
government’s capacity to strengthen its own national source of revenue. In addition, a number of 
analysts have argued that such consistent and high levels of foreign aid disbursement will yield 
more opportunities and corruption consequently becomes the rudiments for such nations (Knack, 
2001; Knack & Rahman, 2007; Anten, et al. 2012). With the power and control of resources that 
comes with many government positions, most notably where democratic governance is weak, 
individuals in these positions are likely to take advantage. This is an opportunity that presents itself 
in the form of huge amounts of foreign support disbursed into a national system without an 
effective infrastructure to effectively implement the aim of the foreign support and with a 
dysfunctional governance environment (Colombatto, 2003). 
Abuzeid (2009) argues that foreign aid has the possibility to cause rifts and biases in a nation’s 
public sector, as well as creating a national atmosphere where there is no stern force for operational 
reforms. Drawing on the work of Svensson (2000) and Alesina & Weder (2002), Abuzeid further 
suggests that aid donors, including bilateral and multilateral, often do not require effective 
governance as a determinant of aid allocation; that is, even when governance conditions are 
required, the evidence indicates that the required governance conditions are often inadequate and 
not stringently monitored (Abuzeid, 2009). 
Moyo (2009) also supports the argument that foreign aid is given without adequate 
safeguards or governance performance requirements. In other words, aid is continually disbursed 
into a non-effective system of government where there have been obvious failures in properly 
utilizing previously disbursed funds. What this presupposes is that foreign aid can become free 
money that becomes embezzled through rent-seeking behaviour with the anticipation of even more 
foreign aid. Developing countries such as the Sub-Saharan African nations becomes increasingly 
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dependent on foreign donors for most of the revenue needed to run the state, thereby creating 
continuous opportunity for bureaucratic political structure with less accountability (Goldsmith, 
2001; Moss, Pettersson, Van De, 2006; Moyo, 2009).  
Similarly, Platteau & Gaspart, (2003) supports the argument that Africa does not have 
adequate infrastructural facilities to utilize the amount of foreign support that the continent is 
receiving in foreign aid. Which means that pumping huge amount of foreign aid into a developing 
country with obvious poor state of infrastructure (e.g., funding for a dam but there are no adequate 
roads and transporting system to the location of the dam project) is a way of encouraging 
corruption and leaving the foreign aid funds lying idle in the pockets of the political elites (Moyo, 
2009; Platteau, et al. 2003; Johnson & Sharma, 2004; Fagbadebo, 2007). The high level of 
corruption in the African governance system is a major reason why foreign aid may not be a good 
reason to improve Africa’s social and economic development. In other words, existing corruption 
makes it easier for political elites and government officials to syphon the millions of dollars of 
foreign support allocated to move Africa from its under-developed stage to a developed stage 
(Goldsmith, 2001; Moss, Pettersson & Van De, 2006; Goldsmith, 2001; Moyo, 2009). Similar to 
the findings of these researchers, opportunity theory does argue that laxity in the governance 
sanctions guiding the usage and allocation of foreign aid and support in Africa makes them 
vulnerable to theft.  Simply put, what are the guidelines set by donor nations for aid allocation and 
its use in the recipient countries? And what happens when these set guidelines (if any) are not 
adhered to by recipient countries?  
Alesina & Weder (2002) investigated the levels of corruption in aid recipient countries and 
the levels of aid continually disbursed to less and more corrupt countries. They found that aid 
recipient countries that have exhibited high levels of corruption receive even more foreign support 
as a continuous support for development. The implication of this study reveals the possibility that 
foreign aid indirectly serves to reinforce corruption given the absence of consequences for corrupt 
practices (Alesina & Weder, 2002). In fact, Alesina & Weder (2002) were able to establish that 
bilateral aid kept on increasing for recipient countries with high levels of corruption. Hence, it can 
be inferred that foreign aid leads to corruption since the more corrupt countries tended to have 
received more foreign aid regardless of their increasing corruption. Another interesting finding by 
these researchers was that where the United States was the aid donor, they found that corruption 
is positively related to the disbursement of more aid regardless of the observable increase in 
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corruption by the recipient countries. In addition to these interesting findings is that the United 
States as foreign aid donor supports countries with a democratic system of government than 
countries with an autocratic system of government and releases more support even to countries 
that are evidently increasing in corruption. The implication of this is that the effectiveness of 
foreign aid on development and whether there are opportunity structures around foreign aid is 
contingent on the approach of the aid donors and the types of foreign aid. It is therefore imperative 
to state that this may not be a general tendency across all donor countries although this study 
focuses on the effect of foreign aid on development with less regard to the different foreign aid 
donors. 
2.2.1 Opportunity Perspective on Corruption in Africa 
The value of using an opportunity perspective to understand corrupt political behaviors in 
Africa can be drawn first from the work of Kinney, Brantingham, Wuschke, Kirk, & Brantingham 
(2008). These researchers explain what they termed as ‘crime pattern theory’ and argued that an 
offender can only carry out a criminal act within the context or political environment within which 
he or she is familiar. This will be familiarity with the opportunities that are available within the 
confines of the offender and the rational thought of the expected consequence as preconceived by 
the offender. Kinney, Brantingham, Wuschke, Kirk, & Brantingham’s (2008) argument of the 
crime pattern theory can be used to understand the corruption issue in Africa. Corrupt public office 
holders, who most likely are part of the law makers and enforcers, can understand their legal and 
governance terrain to take advantage of their participation and full awareness about the governance 
factors that have been put in place. In other words, corrupt officials who are aware of the weak 
control of corruption that have been put in place within their own sovereign states can decide to 
take advantage of the opportunity presented in the lax control of corruption that is been 
implemented. Take, for instance, foreign support that has been entrusted to the government of a 
nation with the sole aim of improving the infrastructural condition of the country. Corrupt office 
holders in the infrastructure ministry divert the money for their own personal gain, because of their 
confidence that there will be minimal or no consequences at all for their behavior as a result of the 
lack of deterrence measures put in place.  
Identifying specific opportunity factors, Graycar and Sidebottom (2012) argued that 
corrupt leaders are more likely to embezzle under conditions where they hold monopolized power 
over a project or service and enjoy a discretional power over how the service is executed or 
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allocated. These researchers maintain that corrupt behaviours are supported by the governance 
environment in which they operate. According to Graycar and Sidebottom (2012), this governance 
environment is characterized by insufficient transparency or accountability, and the absence of 
effective deterrence approaches to hold corrupt individuals liable (Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012). 
Grounded in rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), these researchers argue that corrupt 
behaviours are a result of a previously preconceived and thoughtful plan that builds on the 
available opportunities and the lack of effective governance (Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012; Clarke 
& Felson, 2010).  
These arguments find support with Okada & Samreth (2012) who finds that aid recipient 
countries with current low level of corruption had a decrease in the level of their corruption because 
of the foreign aid received. What this means is that aid recipient countries with minimal corruption 
had decreasing level of corruption due to the foreign aid released to them. This finding suggests 
that it is not the aid that is critical but rather the governance and poor institutional power within 
the recipient countries that make the difference in whether the aid is used or abused. 
Also, Okada and Samreth (2012) found a distinguishing effect between multilateral aid and 
bilateral aid on corruption. They found that bilateral aid excluding Japan as one of the donor 
countries has no significant impact on corruption reduction, but found that multilateral aid does 
have a positive impact in reducing corruption in aid recipient countries with low level of 
corruption. These results can also be interpreted as fitting within an opportunity perspective in 
that, bilateral aid allocation may create greater opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour since 
bilateral aid is sometimes allocated without considering the institutional quality and the 
governance capacity in recipient countries (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Mohammed, et al. 2014).  
However, another study found that foreign aid has a reduction effect on corruption in Africa 
particularly in more corrupt nations (Mohamed, Kaliappan, Ismail, & Azman-Saini, 2014). These 
findings are contrary with that of Okada and Samreth (2012) where it is found that the reduction 
effect of foreign aid on corruption is only in countries with low level of corruption even though 
both studies record the reduction impacts of foreign aid on corruption.  
From these findings, it is possible to argue in line with the problem statement of this study 
that the possibility of aid allocation in increasing development or corruption is contingent on 
governance and the opportunities available in a poor institutional and governance environment. 
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Poor institutional and governance environment alongside aid allocation is what creates the 
situation and contexts of opportunity for corrupt practices in handling foreign aid.  
2.2.2 Rational Choice Theory and Opportunity Perspective 
Opportunity theory provides a situational explanation of crime where people decide to 
commit a criminal act depending on contexts that avail themselves and whether they can measure 
the consequence(s) of engaging in a crime as opposed to not engaging in the crime. Opportunity 
theory is also grounded more broadly in Rational Choice theory in that it assumes that crime is 
based on an individual’s need as well as the environment and the situation in which individuals 
find themselves to exploit for personal gain (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). In other words, rational 
choice theory underlies opportunity in that it is assumed in opportunity theory that human beings 
are self-interested rational thinkers who calculate cost and benefits and act to maximize benefits 
and minimize costs. Accordingly, they take the opportunities when they are presented. Similarly, 
deterrence theory is another variation of rational choice theory in as much as it predicts that 
deviance or crime is a function of the probability of being caught and punished and the severity of 
the punishment. This analysis supports the view of corrupt behaviour as an abuse of one’s 
discretional and monopolized power by taking advantage of presented opportunities to enrich 
one’s self. Here a corporate or political leader or official thinks and rationalizes the opportunity 
and benefits that is accruable to him or her through the abuse of his or her political power or office. 
A conviction follows the rational thought and a choice to either proceed with the preconceived 
criminogenic or corrupt act or to desist is made and when the former is embraced which is to 
commit the criminal or corrupt act, then the individual’s behaviour is purposeful having weighed 
the options of the consequences (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Clarke & Felson, 2010; Graycar & 
Sidebottom, 2012). 
While the rational choice model is implicit, opportunity theory itself focuses on the 
contexts or situations and assumes the rational choice as what lies behind the actions taken in those 
contexts. The social contexts which research suggests are particularly relevant are the mechanisms 
or relations which give access to rewards and the governance environment, such as regulatory 
quality, rule of law, transparency and accountability that guides and interprets what behaviour are 
acceptable or punishable in a society. What we often see in most African countries are ineffective 
rule of law and lack of law enforcement that affords government officials a positive field within 
which they can funnel funds from foreign aid for their personal use (Clarke & Felson, 2010; 
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Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012). In addition, there is a somewhat similarity between opportunity 
theory and deterrence theory in the sense that opportunity theory is concerned with the positive 
avenues available to rewards through corruption, while deterrence theory focuses on the fear of 
being caught as the basis of deterrence (Akers, 1991; Clarke & Cornish, 1986; Garlanad & Sparks, 
2000). 
2.3 Foreign aid and socio-economic development in Africa 
Furthermore, donor countries have been found to often support developing countries with 
which they have cultural and political ties (Ram, 2003). Ram found that donor countries with these 
strategic ties have more of their benefits at mind than supposed notion of supporting the 
development of their aid recipient countries. In other words, donor countries or bilateral aid donors 
unlike the multilateral aid donors disburse more aid support to recipient countries that they 
anticipate being able to manipulate based on the shared strategic ties. The self-interest motive at 
the heart of the donor countries comes to play as they are able to covertly or indirectly manipulate 
the recipient countries as a condition of aid disbursement. The implication of such an approach is 
breeding corruption in the recipient countries’ system of governance in as much as they consider 
the self-interest conditions outlined by the bilateral aid donors (Ram, 2003). Recipient countries 
are thus indirectly conditioned to adjust their governance and institutional policy towards 
accommodating the pre-determined conditions set out by the donor countries for aid allocation 
(Dunning, 2004; Zafar, 2007; Nielsen, 2013).  
The causal chain between governance and economic outcome has also been well studied. 
One study found that increase in the flow of foreign support in the form of official development 
assistance as a percentage of gross domestic product yields a positive improvement on Africa’s 
development, as well as improve a democratic governance environment (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; 
Goldsmith, 2001). What this means is that foreign support via ODA disbursement does have a 
positive effect on Africa’s development and system of government. On the contrary, Ahmed 
(2014) stated that corruption is a major hindrance to the positive impact that aid is supposed to 
have on development in Africa This study focused on how total foreign aid, infrastructure aid and 
governance has significantly impacted corruption and socio-economic development in Africa. 
Ahmed (2014) using the big push theory as well as the theory of aid and economic growth found 
that foreign aid does not have any significant effect on economic growth where the governance 
environment is effective.  
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 Similarly, another study analysed the effect of colossal amount of foreign aid disbursement 
on development and growth in Africa. This study controlled for governance environment using the 
International Country Risk Guide’s (1CRG) index to measure institutional quality and its 
relationship to the effectiveness of high aid financing on the development of Sub-Saharan African 
countries (Brantingham, 2000). Brantingham argued that continuous or long-term aid financing in 
huge proportions as the big push theory suggests may have far more detrimental influence on 
Africa’s development than any benefit. What this presupposes is that continuous and huge aid 
financing in the manner that the big push approach theorizes may not have any significant positive 
impact on the economy and development of the recipient countries (like in the case of Sub-Saharan 
African countries). Apparent in this researcher’s investigation is that high level of aid financing in 
Sub-Saharan African countries is unlikely to yield any positive impact that was envisaged upon 
aid disbursement. The researcher’s argument is from the viewpoint that developing countries like 
the Sub-Saharan African countries lack effective governance and institutional quality that is 
needed for the operational use of foreign aid support (Brantingham, 2000). 
According to Werlin (2005), good governance alongside transparency in the government 
and mode of political operations have significant roles in ensuring that the impact of foreign aid is 
noticeable on the socio-economic development of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Some of the studies find that the quality of governance and institutions is paramount in 
explaining levels of investment, suggesting that one way in which good governance (a state with 
effective rule of law and law enforcement) can enhance economic performance is by boosting the 
climate for capital creation (World Bank, 2003; Kirkpatrick, Parker & Zhang, 2004). Furthermore, 
the World Bank (2002) and Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2004) suggested that setting the ‘rules 
of games’ impacts economic development. This is because economic development is seen not just 
as a matter of assembling economic resources in the form of human and physical capital but a 
matter of “institutional building”. Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004) further explains that “institution 
building” that involves the fabrication of a good regulatory regime is one of the most strenuous 
issues facing developing countries. 
Using regression on a cross-section of countries, Robert and Jones (1999) as well as 
Kauffman and Kray (2005) identified the contributing effects of effective and sound governance 
on high per capita income in the long run. Again, Kauffman and Kray (2005) applied experiential 
procedure in testing for a causal effect which leads to the recognition of strong positive causal 
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effects ranging from better governance to higher per capita income and predicted that a one 
standard deviation increment in governance leads to a two to three-fold difference in income levels 
on the long run. Kauffman findings are consistent with Ram’s (2003) conclusion that foreign aid 
donors indirectly support corruption by adopting elusive and care-free approaches in aid allocation 
and disbursement.  
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I explained the history of foreign aid and presented empirical literature 
arguing against the approach of the big push perspective that is generally believed especially by 
foreign aid donors that foreign aid allocation is to improve development. Adopting the opportunity 
theory of situational factors, I explained that foreign aid does increases corrupt practices in 
developing countries. Literature presented in this chapter points to the fact that developing 
countries such as the Sub-Saharan aid dependent African countries have weak governance and 
poor institutional power undermining the possibility for any rigid approach towards reducing 
corruption for development to take place. Thus, I present an argument that the relationship between 
foreign aid and socio-economic development in Africa is negative. 
Evidence supporting that infrastructural aid may provide more opportunity for syphoning 
the funds more than the other forms of foreign aid was also presented in this chapter. I used the 
opportunity theory to argue that aid allocation is usually released to developing countries because 
of the benefits that may be accruable to donor countries from aid recipient countries and thus 
leading to corruption and the atmosphere of lax governance and institutional quality for aid 
recipient countries. Hence, I proposed that the effect of foreign aid will be reduced in more corrupt 
governance environment. This chapter provides insight to the rational choice behavior that 
underlies the opportunity seeking behaviour of government officials and public office holders and 
explained that taking advantage of the opportunity factors to engage in corruption is higher in 
countries with less accountability and effective governance control.  
In the next chapter, I provide details on the regression analysis as well as data and the unit 
of analysis adopted for data collection in this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Research Data and Measures 
3.0 Introduction 
The main objective of this study is to report findings on how forms of foreign aid to African 
countries increase corruption within the government system and how corruption inhibits the impact 
of foreign aid on socio-economic development. To reiterate, the research questions guiding this 
study are: Does infrastructure aid increases corruption in African countries? To what extent does 
corruption affect the effect of infrastructural aid on socio-economic development in African 
countries? Does corruption affect the impact of foreign aid on socio-economic development in 
Sub-Saharan African nations?  
Consistent with past research findings that corruption is a result of weak governance and 
institutional power, this study provides evidence that the impact of aid on social and economic 
development is related to the level of corruption among public office holders which in turn is 
linked to a weak governance environment (Dunning, 2004; Shah & Schacter, 2004; Fagbadebo, 
2007; Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011; Nielsen, 2013; Havrylyshyn, 2016). This study also recognizes that 
the type of aid matters in providing added opportunity for corruption (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; 
Radelet, 2006; Moyo, 2009; Yin & Vaschetto, 2011). 
3.1 Research Design and Rationale 
This study employs a quantitative approach to examine the impact of foreign aid on the 
social and economic development of Sub-Saharan African countries. Quantitative research enables 
researchers to objectively examine the relationship between the research variables of interest and 
can report hypothetical findings based on specific research questions (Creswell, 2013). 
Quantitative analysis also allows for operationalised definitions of variables which can be used to 
create causal linkages (Bryman, 1984). Quantitative research methods also provide opportunities 
for social research to be replicable in different settings which increases reliability and validity – 
key challenges in social research (Bryman, 1984; Matveev, 2002; Creswell, 2013). This study uses 
established quantified measures20 to investigate relationships between foreign aid and 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries. The quantified measures enabled me to investigate 
                                                 
20 The quantified measures adopted in this study are; total foreign aid (2011 constant USD), total infrastructure aid 
(2011 constant USD), control of corruption, GDP growth (annual percentage), health expenditure (percent of GDP) 
democracy and regulatory quality. 
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the salient element of corruption that hinders the impact of foreign aid on socio-economic 
development in the Sub-Saharan African region. For this reason, this research adopts quantified 
measures of governance and institutional quality to explain how weak governance environment 
provides opportunity. The opportunity which then permits corrupt practices among public and 
political office holders in abusing foreign support, thereby hindering the impact of foreign support 
on development for their personal gains. 
3.2 Population 
The population for this study is the Sub-Saharan African countries. Sub-Saharan African 
countries are located south of the Saharan desert (UN, 2010). The Sub-Saharan African region 
consists of about 52 countries (LOC, 2010). According to the World Bank, the population of Sub-
Saharan Africa increased from over 185 million to almost 900 million people between 1950 and 
2010. In the nearest future, the population of Nigeria, one of the countries in the Sub-Saharan 
region is estimated to overtake the population of the United States of America by about 30 million 
people (WB, 2014). In 2010, over 400 million people were recorded to be living in extreme 
poverty21 across Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank reports that the percentage of people living 
on or below $1.25 per day as 48.5 percent of the total population of the Sub-Saharan African region 
as of 2010 (WB, 2014). According to the United Nations, 37 percent of the Sub-Saharan African 
population are living without access to clean water, causing more than 50 percent of the population 
of Africans to have water-borne diseases (UN, 2010). According to the UN’s index, the average 
life expectancy in about 28 Sub-Saharan African countries is 32 years, less than the average life 
expectancy in countries with progressive human growth (UN, 2006). 
3.3.0 Data and Sample 
The study sample consists of 49 Sub-Saharan African countries as represented in Table 1 
below. The selected countries for this study have variations in their system of government, rule of 
law, governance quality and approaches towards corruption. 
Table 1. List of Sub-Saharan African Countries 
Angola The Gambia Rwanda 
                                                 
21 Extreme poverty is defined as daily living on $2 US dollars or less (WB, 2014) 
26 
 
Benin Ghana São Tomé and Principe 
Botswana Guinea Senegal 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Seychelles 
Burundi Kenya Sierra Leone 
Cameroon Lesotho Somalia 
Cape Verde Liberia South Africa 
Central African Republic Madagascar Sudan 
Chad Malawi Swaziland 
Comoros Mali Tanzania 
Congo  Mauritania Togo 
Côte d’Ivoire Mauritius Uganda 
Djibouti Mozambique Western Sahara 
Equatorial Guinea Namibia Zambia 
Eritrea Niger Zimbabwe 
Ethiopia Nigeria  
Gabon Reunion  
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Source: World Bank’s list of sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
As shown on the sample descriptive statistics table below, the sample consists of 327 
country year observation where data is available over the space of 12 years between 2002 and 
2014. 
 
Table 2. Sample Descriptive Statistics, 49 Countries, 2002-2014 
    Variable N (Country 
       years)  
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Total aid (2011 constant USD)   327  6.15   1.30 3.30 9.54 
 
Total infrastructure aid (2011 
constant USD) 
  327  3.44   1.57  0 6.43 
Democracy   327  2.03    5.28  -9 10 
 
Regulatory quality   327  -0.67    0.59  -2.26 0.86 
 
Control of Corruption   327  -0.62    0.57  -1.71 1.14 
 
GDP growth (annual 
percentage) 
  327  5.98    4.48  0.08 38.0 
 
Health expenditure, total (% of 
GDP) 
  327  5.77    2.30  1.63 14.40 
 
 
Data for this study is all derived from the World Development Indicators (WDIs) of the 
World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – Creditor 
Reporting System dataset, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Polity 
IV dataset. The source from the WDI is the estimates developed by the UN Inter-Agency Groups 
(UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population Division – World Population Prospects), 
World Bank’s National Accounts data, Organisation, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD) National Accounts data files, United Nations Statistical Division 
(Population and Vital Statistics Report), Census, and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).  
This study uses foreign aid in its total flow, infrastructural aid and control of corruption in 
examining socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan African nations, as well as examine 
foreign aid in the disbursement of total infrastructural aid and its impact on control of corruption 
and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In addition, this study further includes other forms of governance measures (such as 
democracy, control of corruption, and regulatory quality) as control variables to investigate their 
effects and interacting effect alongside aid allocation on socio-economic development in Sub-
Saharan African countries. Each of this identified research variable is further discussed below with 
reference to the sample descriptive statistics. 
The dataset for this research is a ‘long’ format longitudinal panel dataset where each 
country has one observation per given year and the variables measure that indicator for a country 
in each year. Thus, it means there is no observed change in the level of a variable in a year if the 
indicators of the same variable remain the same in the next year.  
3.3.1 Independent Variables 
In the first analysis, the focal independent variable is infrastructural aid. For this study, 
infrastructural aid refers to foreign aid or support for investment in infrastructure projects in 
recipient countries (OECD, 2016). It is the distribution of bilateral ODA commitments by 
economic sector and does not denote the type of goods and services provided. These data are sums 
of individual projects notified under the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. It is measured in 
million USD constant prices, using 2014 as the base year (OECD, 2016). Infrastructural aid as 
represented in this study’s sample has a mean of 3.44, standard deviation of 1.57, minimum of 0 
and maximum of 6.43 (all values reported in logged US dollars). 
In my second analysis, the focal independent variable remains as infrastructural aid 
(defined above). In the third analysis, the focal independent variable is total foreign aid. Foreign 
aid in this respect refers to total Official Development Assistance (ODA). The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as government-sponsored aid 
designed to promote economic development and welfare of developing counties (OECD, 2016). 
According to the OECD (2016), ODA does not include loans and credits for military purposes. 
ODA can be provided bilaterally to developing counties by donor countries or multilaterally by a 
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group of development agency such as the United Nations (UN). ODA includes grants, and 
concessional “soft” loans where the grant element is at least 25 percent of the total and the 
provision of technical assistance (OECD, 2016). Total foreign aid in my sample has a mean of 
6.15 US dollars, standard deviation of 1.30 US dollars, minimum of 3.30 US dollars and maximum 
of 9.54 US dollars (all values reported in logged US dollars). 
3.3.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this study are corruption and indicators of socio-economic 
development. Corruption is defined based on the World Bank’s definition of control of corruption 
as the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
It is measured based on estimates of control of corruption from weak (-2.5) to strong (2.5) 
performance (World Bank, 2015). The descriptive statistics (see Table 2) of the control of 
corruption shows a mean of -0.62, standard deviation of 0.57, minimum of -1.71, and maximum 
of 1.14. It is measured in million USD constant prices, using 2014 as the base year (OECD, 2016) 
Socio-economic development is the process of social and economic development in the 
society, usually measured with indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of 
employment (World Bank, 2015). This study measures socio-economic development using total 
health expenditure (as percent of GDP), and gross domestic product (GDP) annual percent growth. 
The total health expenditure (as percent of GDP) is the sum of public and private health 
expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family planning 
activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not include 
provision of water and sanitation. As shown in Table 2, health expenditure has a mean of 5.77, 
standard deviation of 2.30, minimum of 1.63 and maximum of 14.40. It is measured in million 
USD constant prices (all values reported in logged US dollars), using 2014 as the base year 
(OECD, 2016). 
GDP growth (annual percent) is defined as the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Bank, 2015). Aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 US dollars. GDP annual growth shows a mean of 5.98, standard deviation of 4.48, 
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minimum of 0.08 and maximum of 38.022. Although the GDP growth (annual percent) and health 
expenditure have their limitations as do all measures of economic and social development seeks 
to be accurate representation of African nations’ social and economic status to the grass root level 
(which includes the high income, middle income, low income and the poor individuals represented 
in this study). The GDP growth is adopted as a measure of economic development as data available 
for this indicator is consistent across the countries of interest. 
 
3.3.3 Controls 
However, it is important to control for other variables that have impact on socio-economic 
development. Past research argues that poor governance environment inhibits development and 
the influence of foreign aid. Sound policies as identified by past researchers includes regulatory 
quality and democratic system of government for true representation (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; 
Collier & Dollar, 2001, 2002; Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Lgbarkrmen, et al. 2014). 
Hence, included in the analysis as control variables for governance measures are regulatory quality 
and democracy (each from the World Bank and Crime and Polity IV datasets). The control 
independent variables are explained below: 
Regulatory Quality: According to the UNODC, regulatory quality refers to the perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development (WGI, 2015). The regulatory quality indicators combine 
available surveys and assessments of about fifteen countries. This indicator draws on applicable 
data from the World Banks’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, Bertelsmann Foundation’s Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, the World Bank’s Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, Global 
Insight’s Business Conditions and Risk Indicators, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, 
the Institute for Management and Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, Political Risk 
Service’s International Country Risk Guide, the French Government’s Institutional Profiles 
Database, the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s Rural Sector Performance 
Assessments, the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s Transition Report, the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report, and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Risk Service (WGI, 2015) 
                                                 
22 The research data shows a few countries like Equatorial Guinea records a high increase of GDP annual growth. 
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Democracy: is defined as the freedom at which a country’s citizens has the freedom to elect their 
government representatives and officials through a free and fair election. This democracy data is 
derived from Polity IV dataset that uses a 21-point scale ranging from negative 10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to plus 10 (consolidated democracy) to determine a country’s level of democracy 
(Polity IV, 2016). This data contains yearly evidence on democracy level for independent states 
that has a population of over 500,000 and covers from 1800 to 2016. Polity IV’s inferences about 
a country’s democracy level are determined by the evaluation of that country’s elections for 
openness and competitiveness, the extent of checks on executive authority, and the nature of 
political participation (Polity IV, 2016). 
3.4 Approach to Analysis 
The current study uses a fixed effect regression model to analyze the impact of foreign aid 
on corruption and socio-economic development in Sub-Saharan African countries.  This study is 
a panel study as it measures data on the sample of 49 countries over twelve years from 2002 – 
2014. Foreign aid (total) and infrastructural aid levels were highly skewed, and therefore were log-
transformed before including in the analysis. The focal independent variables (total foreign aid 
and infrastructural aid), alongside the control variables, regulatory quality and democracy were 
lagged two years behind the dependent variables to allow for a time gap in which the effects of the 
kinds of aid and governance measures might take hold through the twelve years. For example, my 
analysis predicts the effects of all independent variables in 2002 on social development in 2004, 
or the effects of independent variables in 2010 on economic development in 2012. A Haussmann 
test specified that fixed effects regression model was preferred for the analysis. Also, the fixed 
effect regression model allows the isolation of the independent variable in this analysis to account 
for the changes in the dependent variables within countries overtime. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS OF STUDY 
4.0 Introduction 
To test hypothesis 1 (Table 3), the first regression analysis regresses control of corruption 
on the total infrastructural aid measure. This first regression model adopted measures of regulatory 
quality and democracy as control variables for state’s governance to arrive at a more accurate 
model of the effects of infrastructural aid on control of corruption. 
To test hypothesis 2 (Table 4 and 5), the socio-economic development variables, health 
expenditure (percent of GDP), and annual growth in GDP (percent) are first regressed on 
infrastructural aid. Next, the socio-economic development variables are regressed on 
infrastructural aid and control of corruption. Finally, socio-economic measures of development are 
regressed on infrastructural aid interacted with control of corruption. Governance measures 
consistent with those in Table 3 were added in the analysis as control variables to arrive at a more 
precise model of foreign aid on socio-economic development within the governance environment.  
To test hypothesis 3 (Table 6 and 7), the focal independent variable shifts from total 
infrastructural aid to total foreign aid. The socio-economic development variables, which is health 
expenditure (percent of GDP) and annual GDP growth (percent) are regressed on total foreign aid; 
total foreign aid and control of corruption; and total foreign aid interacted with control of 
corruption. Governance measures consistent with the first two analyses were added as control 
variables to arrive at a more precise model of the effects of foreign aid on socio-economic 
development within the governance environment. All the independent measures were lagged two 
years behind the dependent measures to allow for a progressive gap in which the effects of total 
foreign aid and infrastructural aid hold. 
4.1.0 The Effect of Infrastructural Aid on Control of Corruption in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
Table 3 presents the results examining the effects of infrastructural aid on corruption in 
weak governance environment. The results from Table 3 show that there is no significant statistical 
effect of infrastructural aid on control of corruption.  In the first model, the results indicate that 
infrastructural aid does not seem to have any significant impact on control of corruption when 
other factors such as the governance environment are not considered. In model 2 when the level 
of regulatory quality in Sub-Saharan African countries is added, the results show that a 1-point 
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increase in regulatory quality predicts a 0.27-point increase in control of corruption in Sub-Saharan 
African countries while the effect of infrastructural aid is still insignificant. While there is also 
reduction in the coefficients of infrastructural aid when regulatory quality is added, this is at 
insignificant levels. When lagged democracy was controlled for in model 3, the effect of regulatory 
quality is similar to model 2 but democracy itself does not have any significant effect on 
corruption. These results again show that the coefficient of the focal independent variable 
(infrastructural aid) is decreased compared to model 2 but at insignificant levels. These findings 
do not support the proposed research hypothesis that predicts that infrastructural aid will lead to 
increase in corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries with weak governance.   
 
Table 3: The Effect of Infrastructural Aid on Corruption in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Lagged Infrastructural Aid, 
all donors (Constant 2011 
USD) 
 
0.011 
 
  -0.001 
 
   -0.005 
 
Lagged Regulatory Quality 
(Estimate) 
 
 
 
0.267*** 
 
0.271*** 
 
Lagged Democracy (Polity 
IV Score) 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.011 
      
Constant  -0.654***  -0.433***  -0.441*** 
Observation      327      327       327 
R-Squared    0.0027    0.0677    0.0765 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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4.2.0 Infrastructural Aid, Corruption, and Socio-Economic Development in Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
The results of hypothesis two are presented in two tables, one for each kind of development. 
Table 4 and Table 5 presents the results examining the effects of infrastructural aid and control of 
corruption on socio-economic development. 
4.2.1 The Effect of Infrastructural Aid and Corruption on Health Expenditure in Sub-
Saharan African Countries 
Table 4 presents the results examining the effects of infrastructural aid and control of 
corruption on social development (total health expenditure). In each model, infrastructural aid is 
seen to have different effects on total health expenditure with significant and insignificant 
coefficients across the three models of analysis. The results of Table 4 in the first model 
demonstrate that infrastructural aid has a significant positive effect on social development without 
controlling for governance measures. The results of the first model show that with any 10 percent 
increase in infrastructural aid, there will be an increase of 0.23 in total health expenditure at a 
significant level of p<0.01. In model 2, when the control of corruption estimate in Sub-Saharan 
African countries is controlled, the results show that a 10 percent increase in infrastructural aid 
will yield a 0.22 increase in total health expenditure. An important observation in this model is 
that a 1 percent increase in control of corruption will yield a 1.2 increase in total health expenditure 
as a percent of GDP.  
 
Table 4: The Effect of Infrastructural Aid and Corruption on Social Development (Health 
Expenditure) in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2002-2014 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Lagged Infrastructural Aid, all donors (Constant 2011 USD) 
  0.229**   0.216**     0.024 
 
Control of Corruption (Estimate) 
 1.160*** 1.947*** 
 
Interaction Term:  
Lagged Infrastructural Aid X Control of Corruption 
  
-0.236* 
 
   -0.110 
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Lagged Regulatory Quality (Estimate)       
 
Lagged Democracy (Polity IV Score) 
  0.088* 
Constant 4.983*** 5.741*** 6.141*** 
Observation    327    327     327 
R-Squared  0.0353  0.0732   0.109 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In model 3, as shown in Table 4 the interaction of infrastructural aid and control of 
corruption is statistically significant at p<0.001with an interaction coefficient of -0.236. This result 
is the reverse of what was hypothesized, since it indicates that as the control of corruption 
increases, the positive effect of infrastructural aid on health expenditure is decreased. As shown in 
Figure 1, the effect of infrastructural aid on health expenditure is positive but decreasing when 
reaching about -0.6 on the control of corruption scale, at which point the effect of infrastructural 
aid is no longer statistically different than zero. This is indicated because the 95% confidence 
interval spikes cross zero in all estimates after that point. This means that aid is associated with 
increased health spending in the most corrupt countries, but once corruption is controlled, aid has 
little or no influence on health spending. The results of this model also show that while lagged 
regulatory quality was insignificant, there was a weak but statistically significant 0.1 percentage 
point increase in total health expenditure when democracy increases by one point. 
    [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2.2 The Effect of Infrastructural Aid and Corruption on GDP annual growth in Sub-
Saharan African Countries 
Table 5 shows the results examining the effects of infrastructural aid and control of 
corruption on economic development (GDP growth, annual percentage).  In this instance, there are 
no significant effects evident in any of the models suggesting that infrastructural aid, corruption 
and governance measures have limited effects on GDP whether independently or in interaction.   
 
Table 5: The Effect of Infrastructural Aid and Corruption on Economic Development 
(GDP Annual Growth) in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2002-2014 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Lagged Infrastructural Aid, all donors (Constant 2011 USD) 
0.027 -0.030 -0.043 
 
Control of Corruption (Estimate) 
 0.367 0.394 
 
Interaction Term: 
Lagged Infrastructural Aid X Control of Corruption 
  -0.006 
 
Lagged Regulatory Quality (Estimate) 
  -0.177 
 
Lagged Democracy (Polity IV Score) 
  0.049 
Constant 1.625*** 1.865*** 1.694*** 
Observation    327    327     327 
R-Squared 0.0008 0.0070 0.0168 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.3.0 Foreign Aid, Corruption, and Socio-Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The results of hypothesis three are presented in two tables, one for each kind of 
development. Table 6 and Table 7 presents the results examining the effects of total foreign aid 
and control of corruption on socio-economic development. 
4.3.1 The Effect of Foreign Aid and Corruption on Social Development in Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
Table 6 examines the effect of total foreign aid and corruption on social development (total 
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP). In the first model, it is seen that total aid has a 
significant relationship with total health expenditure, with a 10 percent increase in total aid 
predicting a 0.31 percentage point increase in total health expenditure. The results of the second 
model show that infrastructural aid maintains a significant effect on total health expenditure. The 
results show that a 10 percent point increase in infrastructural aid will lead to a 0.26 percentage 
point decrease in total health expenditure when control of corruption is controlled for. The results 
of the first and second models on the effect of total aid on total health expenditure displays a 
possible sign of collinearity being that the result shows a slight decrease from 0.31 percentage 
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point to -0.26 percentage point with both coefficients reported at significant levels. Similarly, the 
results show a significant increase in total health expenditure with one-point increase in control of 
corruption predicting a 1 percent increase in total health expenditure.  
 
Table 6: The Effect of Foreign Aid and Corruption on Social Development (Health 
Expenditure) in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2002-2014 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged Total Aid, all donors (Constant 2011 USD) 
 
0.311*** -0.255** 0.104 
Control of Corruption (Estimate) 
 
 
1.010** 2.139* 
Interaction Term: 
Lagged Total Aid X Control of Corruption 
 
  
-0.194 
Lagged Regulatory Quality (Estimate) 
 
  
-0.071 
Lagged Democracy (Polity IV Score) 
  
0.104** 
Constant 3.856*** 4.823*** 5.437*** 
Observation    327    327     327 
R-Squared 0.0395 0.0671 0.0960 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The interaction of total aid and control of corruption shown in model 3 indicates that as 
control of corruption increases by one point, the effect of total aid decreases by 0.2 percentage 
point. Interestingly, these interaction results also indicate the main effect of control of corruption 
on total health expenditure when no foreign aid is received, it predicts a 2.1 percentage point 
increase in total health expenditure. 
The results of this interaction model are shown in Figure 2. Essentially, this result again 
shows that the effect of total foreign aid on health expenditure is strongest when corruption is 
highest, the reverse of what I hypothesized. Furthermore, as corruption decreases, the effect of 
total aid on health expenditure decreases and is no longer statistically different from zero once the 
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control of corruption scale exceeds about -0.4. This means that total foreign aid has the greatest 
effect in the most corrupt countries but the effect becomes negligible once the control of corruption 
is improved.  Also, this result reveals that while regulatory quality shows an insignificant reduction 
effect on total health expenditure, democracy indicates a slight effect of 0.1-point increase in total 
health expenditure at the p<0.01 level. 
Since the results show the same pattern for infrastructure aid and total aid, one question 
that comes to mind is what percentage of total aid is taken by infrastructural aid? If the percentage 
taken by infrastructural aid is high, this result may still signal the main effect of total aid, and if 
not, it implies that the effect holds on all kinds of aid. 
     [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.2 The Effect of Foreign Aid and Corruption on Economic Development in Sub-Saharan 
African Countries 
Finally, in Table 7, the results show the absence of a statistically significant effect of total foreign 
aid and corruption on GDP growth in Sub-Saharan African countries. These findings are 
unexpected as one would anticipate that total foreign aid, control of corruption, regulatory quality 
and democracy will at some point demonstrate significant influence on GDP annual growth. 
 
Table 7: The Effect of Foreign Aid and Corruption on Economic Development (GDP 
Annual Growth) in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2002-2014 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Lagged Total Aid, all donors (Constant 2011 USD) 
0.062 0.044 0.083 
 
Control of Corruption (Estimate) 
 0.324 -0.062 
 
Interaction Term: 
Lagged Total Aid X Control of Corruption 
  0.069 
 
Lagged Regulatory Quality (Estimate) 
  -0.235 
 
Lagged Democracy (Polity IV Score) 
  0.042 
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Constant 1.154* 1.464**  1.010 
Observation    327    327    327 
R-Squared 0.0026 0.0072 0.0175 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.4. Summary 
The results of this study show that foreign aid is associated with increased health 
expenditure, but the effect of foreign aid on health expenditure matters most when the aid recipient 
countries are more corrupt. Once corruption begins to improve, the effect of foreign aid on health 
expenditure diminishes. This signals that perhaps there is less need for foreign aid once the control 
of corruption is effectively put in place, thus making health-related aid less vulnerable to 
corruption.  
This Chapter outlined the findings of the research hypotheses based on secondary data 
adapted to represent 49 Sub-Saharan African countries through quantitative analysis. The results 
were presented within five analyses of three models that are strictly in line with the research 
hypotheses. 
Chapter Five discusses the results of these findings and situates the result findings within 
the larger body of existing literature on foreign aid, corruption and development in Sub-Saharan 
African countries and developing countries. This chapter also elucidates on the conclusion of my 
findings as well as recommendations, limitations and suggestions for future research in this topic. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.0 Introduction 
Recent and existing literature shows that foreign aid and governance are crucial to any 
nation’s social and economic development. Some studies suggest that since foreign aid increases 
corruption in recipient countries, it can be utilized positively in nations with effective governance 
measures (Brautigam, 2000; 2004).  This study shows that aid leads to increased health spending 
in highly corrupt countries, which then makes funds more available to officials via corruption. The 
availability of funds through corruption is what past literature describes as ‘crime pattern theory’ 
in explaining an opportunist perspective of corruption (Kinney, Brantingham, Wuschke, Kirk, & 
Brantingham, 2008).  
Both corruption and ineffective governance environment are also often linked to poor 
productivity in all sectors of a nation’s economy. This study was aimed at examining whether 
corruption undermined the intended development benefits of foreign aid and turned foreign aid 
into fuel for corruption. While the results in this study clearly show that foreign aid on its own has 
significant positive effects on social development or more specifically health expenditures, the 
findings do not demonstrate any effect on general economic development in Sub-Saharan African 
countries as measured by GDP annual growth.  
Also, the results clearly show that all forms of foreign aid do not have the same effects on socio-
economic development and that the effects of foreign aid can be influenced by existing governance 
measures. Importantly, this research findings show that aid appears to have a positive influence in 
more corrupt countries, and the effect diminishes as corruption is brought under control 
5.1 Infrastructural Aid and Corruption in Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 This study provides unexpected findings in that it shows that infrastructural aid does not 
affect corruption and the effect of corruption on the effects of infrastructural aid on development 
is the opposite of expected. The evidence suggests that infrastructural aid contributes to social 
development in more corrupt contexts, but that once corruption reduces, infrastructural aid is less 
effective. Based on these findings, it can be argued that the effect of infrastructural aid may not be 
as important as governance questions related to corruption. What this presupposes is that as long 
as there is infrastructural aid and poor governance measures, corruption is still possible. However, 
the effect of infrastructural aid on health expenditure is higher in more corrupt recipient countries 
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perhaps because infrastructural aid is supporting the whole area of health expenditures, yet there 
are more health problems due to poor governance and the fact that health funds may be going into 
personal pockets (Gupta, Davoodi, Tiongson, 2002; Azfar, 2005; Lewis, 2006; Rose, 2006). On 
the other hand, there is less demand for health expenditures in better governed and less corrupt 
recipient countries (Lewis, 2006) 
Also consistent with the expectations from the literature (Robert & Jones, 1999; Kauffman & Kray 
2005; Werlin, 2005), one of the findings of this study is that regulatory quality reduces corruption, 
which in turn inhibits any opportunity for corrupt practices or mismanagement of infrastructural 
aid for personal gain. When the government’s ability is demonstrated in the formulation and 
efficient implementation of sound policies and governance measures across all social and 
economic sectors in the country, there will be an increase in the control of corruption. 
 Studies also show that corruption affects most development indicators such as 
infrastructure, health spending, and GDP annual growth when there are no proper governance 
measures put in place to monitor allocated foreign aid, thus creating opportunity for corruption 
and misappropriation of funds. (Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Moyo, 2009; Ahmed, 2014).  
Consistent with my findings from literature is the positive influence that democracy demonstrates 
alongside other governance measures (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2001). Democracy as a 
system of government in aid recipient countries will help to curb the monopoly power that 
government officials may have across all sectors. This is because there will be fair representation 
of officials from different political parties and interests in charge of different sectors or government 
ministries, hence reducing the autonomous authority for discretional decision making by a single 
political party. Once there is fair representation of political power among rival parties, it will in 
itself serve as a deterrence approach to hold corrupt officials liable (Graycar & Sidebottom, 2012). 
This implies that when there are controls for more than one governance measures, it leads to a 
consistent level of governance effectiveness on the overall control of corruption (Shah & Schacter, 
2004; Easterly, 2005; Simpson, 2013).  
5.2 Infrastructural Aid and Corruption on Social Development in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
Effective formulation and implementation of sound policies across different sectors such 
as the health care creates the possibility for substantial growth in total health expenditure, which 
in turn increases the quality of lives in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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As resources are depleted by corrupt officials, fewer resources are made available for the 
delivery of quality health services. This has been corroborated by several studies that show that 
corruption affects most health indicators such as infant, child and maternal mortality and 
increasing the control of corruption will improve health outcomes as well as improve health 
spending on the most appropriate services (Gupta, et al. 1999; 2001). Contrary to the findings of 
previous research, the results of my study show that the effect of infrastructural aid on health 
spending is reduced as control of corruption increases. This contrasts with my research hypothesis 
that proposes that the effect of infrastructural aid on social development will be reduced in more 
corrupt governance environment. Again, it can be argued that health spending or expenditure is 
increased only in the less well-governed environments where there no records of health 
improvements possibly because the money is going into personal pockets and not to improve 
health standards.  
As suggested by literature, corrupt government officials abuse the discretional power of 
their political position to approve the purchase of unnecessary medical equipment and wasteful 
pharmaceutical products in exchange for bribes (Lantham, 2001; Kassirer, 2006). This concept 
explains the opportunities that the offending officials within the context of health institutions are 
familiar with and take advantage of these presenting opportunities to enrich their personal pockets.  
Thus, when governance measures such as control of corruption are put in place, it automatically 
rules out the effect that infrastructural aid has on health expenditure because perhaps health 
spending is now being stringently scrutinized and accounted for. 
With more of these governance measures in the health sector, the opportunity for increased 
corruption that increased health expenditure will be mostly eliminated (Gray-Molina, Perez de 
Rada, & Yanez, 2001). Moreover, by ensuring that health care institutions and the rest of the social 
institutions are accredited by following the appropriate procedures, through continuous monitoring 
of these institutions, the social and health services rendered will meet the populations’ 
expectations.  
5.3 Infrastructural Aid and Corruption on Economic Development in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
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As the results on Table 5 indicates, infrastructural aid and control of corruption does not 
have any significant relationship with GDP annual growth23 which runs contrary to the hypothesis 
predicted in this research. These results also run contrary to the effects that infrastructural aid and 
control of corruption have on health expenditure, an indicator of social development. Even though 
these findings are unexpected, there is some support in previous research that foreign aid does not 
significantly improve economic development as measured by GDP (Moyo, 2009; Moss et al., 
2006; Goldsmith, 2001). 
5.4 Total Aid and Corruption on Social Development in Sub-Saharan African Countries 
While corruption has been a bane to productivity in all sectors of the economy, the health 
sector is not an exception. Past studies show that in low and middle-income countries, corruption 
has stifled the growth and prevented the most effective and efficient health services to be delivered 
(Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Lewis, 2006; Ajie & Wokekoro, 2012; Ahmed, 2014). Interestingly, 
the current research also finds that total health expenditure is increased in more corrupt countries. 
Although increase in health expenditure does not translate into an actual positive impact on quality 
health services as this could mean that increased health expenditure makes more funds available 
to corrupt officials for personal gain. This implies that when corruption is prevalent, foreign aid 
can serve as the funds covering the stolen health money disguised as health spending by corrupt 
officials taking advantage of opportunities presented in a weak governance environment. But when 
control of corruption increases, health spending increases with it and aid is not needed to fill the 
gap. Grigoli and Kapsoli (2018) suggests that the efficiency of health expenditures are very low in 
Africa. This may be because health expenditures in more corrupt countries are simply meeting 
needs and are easy targets for corruption, especially when it is infrastructural aid.  
While this analysis provides interesting results, it is important to emphasize good 
governance such as democratic rule of law in low and middle-income countries as this is key to 
increasing control of corruption as indicated in model 3 of Table 6. This will in turn increase total 
health expenditure and eventually leads to quality health services. Thus, to enable the health sector 
to function effectively, and thereby contribute to improved socio-economic development, it is 
                                                 
23 To further confirm these findings, the research explored corruption perception index as a measure of corruption 
and adopted GDP per capita in the place of GDP annual growth. Surprisingly, the results of the later analysis were 
insignificant and like the previous findings that adopted control of corruption and GDP annual growth, which 
further confirms the unexpected results. 
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necessary to promote good governance to ensure the desired health services are attained and 
delivered (Youde, 2010).  
In this thesis, Table 4 and Table 6 presents similar results and effects on social 
development, specifically health expenditure in Sub-Saharan African countries. Although, Table 
4 presented findings of infrastructural aid which is still a portion of the total foreign aid represented 
in Table 6, the results of both analysis were similar and in support of health expenditure. What 
these results show is that as control of corruption increases, the effect of total foreign aid and/or 
infrastructural aid on health expenditure decreases. Again, this could be because the excess funds 
from increased health expenditure that is made available to officials via corruption is no longer 
available once accountability, transparency and other governance are effectively put in place. Past 
research also shows that opportunities for corruption is created by lack of accountability, where 
government officials act in their personal interest with no fear of being apprehended (Segal & 
Summers, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2004; Lewis, 2006; Milewa, 2006; Lewis, 2007) These findings are 
not consistent with the research’s prediction that total foreign aid will have a progressive effect on 
social development in less corrupt countries. Instead, the findings unexpectedly show that social 
development benefit more from total foreign aid in more corrupt countries.  
5.5 Total Foreign Aid and Corruption on Economic Development in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
Similar to infrastructural aid, total foreign aid, corruption and GDP annual growth24 
provides no relationship between these variables unlike the positive increase recorded in the case 
of the health expenditure. This implies that although there is a possibility as predicted by one of 
the research hypotheses that foreign aid and control of corruption may increase GDP annual 
growth, this may not always be the case based on the findings of this analysis. These findings are 
surprising and does not support the hypothetical prediction of the current study that total foreign 
aid and control of corruption will significantly lead to economic development. 
In total, the findings of this current study statistically show that total foreign aid does not 
have any effect on the economic development of African countries. A finding that negates many 
                                                 
24 Further investigations were carried out by the researcher to explain the relationship between total foreign aid, 
control of corruption and economic development. The researcher adopted corruption perception index as a 
measure of corruption, and GDP per capital instead of GDP annual growth as a measure of economic growth, 
however, the findings after the change in variables show no significant relationship between foreign aid, control of 
corruption, and economic development.  
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previous research findings that argues that corruption in African nations is increased to endemic 
levels because of the flow of infrastructural aid that has been suggested by past research to create 
opportunity for corruption in Africa (Mavrotas & McGillivary, 2005; Abuzeid, 2009; Moyo, 
2009).  
Also, my findings reveal that when there is democracy and sound regulatory quality, it is 
more likely to bring about an increase in the level of control of corruption. This finding on 
democracy and regulatory quality as a measure of governance touches on one of the significance 
that this study seeks to achieve. The significant findings on the impact of regulatory quality on 
control of corruption supports the need for firm accountability measures which will decrease the 
opportunity that may present itself in available foreign aid funds. 
Furthermore, my findings establish an unexpected view on the relationship of foreign aid 
and control of corruption, and the effect that this relationship may have on social and economic 
development. Economic development in African countries is neither increased nor influenced by 
foreign aid or control of corruption. To an extent, these findings are consistent with past research 
that argues that foreign aid has failed in contributing and giving the ‘big push’ to Africa’s economic 
development, (Tavares, 2003; Moyo, 2009; Okada & Samreth. 2012), thus addressing another 
significance that this study seeks to contribute in establishing how foreign aid impacts on Africa’s 
development. 
Contrary to past research findings stating that the effectiveness of foreign aid on health 
expenditure and other social development indicators will benefit from less corrupt governance 
environments (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Werlin, 2005; Ajie & Wokekoro, 2012; Graycar & 
Sidebottom, 2012), the findings of the current study shows otherwise. This in other words means 
that aid will do better on social development in more corrupt African countries. In regard to the 
opportunity perspective adopted for this study, increases in health spending in more corrupt 
countries stemming from foreign aid may actually mean more opportunities for corruption to 
officials. This is because of their understanding of the weak governance environment within which 
they function and the rationalization of their corrupt practices without any scrutiny or 
accountability. My explanation finds support from Kinney, Brantingham, Wuschke, Kirk, and 
Brantingham (2008) who argue that an offending official or person can only execute a criminal act 
within the political structure within which he or she exercises monopolized power. The 
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researchers’ description of the ‘crime pattern theory’ further explains on the opportunities that is 
inherent in increased health expenditure only when corruption is increased.  
Lastly, it is not unfamiliar that each Sub-Saharan African country strives to democratize 
governance and fight corruption within its political and national capability, and the development 
of each of these countries in fighting corruption and improving governance varies from one 
another. The variations between these countries in fighting corruption and to democratize 
governance further proves that each of these countries will grow at varying pace to reach the state 
of desired development and consequently becoming a free and fair sovereign nation with less 
corruption. 
5.6 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this study, I stated that the research would focus on foreign aid and 
corruption: its impact on socio-economic development in Sub Saharan Africa. In laying the 
foundation, I stated based on previous researches, that foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa had been 
given for decades for different purposes among which are economic development, social 
development, infrastructural development and general growth. This further led to my research 
statement of hypotheses for ascertaining the impacts that total foreign aid and different forms of 
aid will have in sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the identified indicators (social, economic and 
infrastructural development) within the period being considered under my study (2002-2014). 
Adopted in my data analysis and findings is the control of corruption measure as a determining 
factor on the extent to which total foreign aid or infrastructural aid will affect socio-economic 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
In carrying out the study, I tested for the relationship between infrastructural aid, total 
foreign aid, control of corruption and their impacts on socio-economic development in Sub-
Saharan Africa while also testing for selected governance measures as the control variables for my 
study. 
Using data across the twelve years in which observations were available, I adopted a fixed-
effects panel regression model in analysing the variables in my study. 
To test if infrastructural aid will lead to corruption increase in African nations, I formulated 
3 models of analysis. In formulating these models, I considered infrastructural aid, control of 
corruption & governance measures. The results of this analysis indicate that infrastructural aid 
does not lead to corruption as the results point to the fact that infrastructural aid is uncorrelated 
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with corruption. However, it is clear from the results that infrastructural aid leads to reduction in 
corruption when there is an increase in regulatory quality. Thus, these findings negate my first 
hypothetical statement that infrastructural aid will lead to increase in corruption and negates 
theoretical perspective of my study as the findings does not show that infrastructural aid provides 
opportunity for corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
In a bid to also test if the effect of infrastructural aid on socio-economic development will 
be reduced in more corrupt governance environment as stated in hypothesis 2, two tables were 
presented to independently test for the impact of infrastructural aid on each of the development 
indicators (social and economic development indicators) the different types of developments. 
Using three models of analysis, I tested the effect of infrastructural aid and corruption on total 
health expenditure in Sub-Saharan African Countries. In these three models, I examined 
infrastructural aid, control of corruption and social development (total health expenditure, percent 
of GDP). The interactions of these indicators show that as control of corruption increases, the 
effect of infrastructural aid on health expenditure in Sub-Saharan African countries decreases, thus 
answering the second research question asked in this study. Though the findings are unexpected, 
they offer support for previous research findings that the foreign aid big push does not guarantee 
the assumed or expected growth in development (Alesisna & Weder, 2002; Abuzeid, 2009). These 
unexpected findings make it possible to argue that foreign aid may not be sufficient to achieve the 
desired growth in Sub-Saharan African nations as it is clear from the findings that effective 
governance measures is what is needed in these African nations. In other words, I argue that 
although increase in the control of corruption decreases the effect of foreign aid on health 
expenditure, it also decreases unnecessary health spending and expenditure that may be easily 
channeled towards personal gain and not utilized on health services. What this means is that the 
previous opportunity to embezzle money when health expenditure increases is no longer available 
once there is increase in the control of corruption to regulate public funds. Further research and 
scrutiny on why the effect of infrastructural aid decreases as control of corruption increases in 
future researches may be able to provide explanations to this relationship. 
 The second table tested the effect of infrastructural aid and corruption on economic 
development in Sub-Saharan African Countries. Three models were also considered. In the 
models, we interacted infrastructural aid and control of corruption to assess their impact on GDP 
annual growth and realized that they all have no significant impact on GDP annual growth. This 
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means that regulations have no effect on GDP annual growth and less attention should be given to 
them if economic development is the focus of the government. Again, these findings though odd, 
find support with past literature that argues that foreign aid was wasted and not what Africa needed 
to attain the level of desired development (Alesisna & Weder, 2002; Abuzeid, 2009; Moyo, 2009) 
Lastly, I examined whether the effect of total foreign aid on socio-economic development 
will be reduced in more corrupt governance environment as seen in the third hypothesis. Like in 
the previous results, two tables were presented, one for each of the development indicators. The 
first one tested the effect of foreign aid and corruption on social development in Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Consistent with the impact of infrastructural aid and control of corruption on 
health expenditure, the results of this analysis show that as control of corruption increases, the 
impact of total foreign aid on health expenditure is diminished. This could also be consonant with 
the research by Platteau, et al. (2003) and Moyo (2009), who theorizes that Africa does not have 
adequate infrastructural facilities to utilize the amount of foreign support that is continuously given 
to them, thereby feeding corruption endlessly. The implication could be that any attempt to control 
corruption in those instances would negatively affect other aspects of developments (in this case 
social development).  
The second analysis tested the effect of foreign aid and corruption on economic 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries. Foreign aid, total GDP annual growth, and control 
of corruption were employed here with 3 models also formulated. The results show that the 
independent variables (foreign aid and control of corruption) do not have any significant impact 
on GDP annual growth across the 3 models. 
These findings contradict the hypothetical assumption of the researcher which may be partly due 
to the limitation of available data.  
Given the results of this study, the applicability of opportunity theory towards explaining 
foreign aid and corruption cannot be over-emphasized. This is because opportunity theory takes 
on the situational contexts in explaining corrupt and illegal behaviors of a rational thinker who 
seeks to take advantage of the opportunity presented in available funds with ineffective regulation 
and accountability. Nonetheless, increased control of corruption in both cases of foreign aid shows 
that the opportunity for continuous corruption cannot be reduced if not completely eliminated until 
an effective governance environment is achieved. Also, if further research studies extensively 
49 
 
explore all the indicators of foreign aid, and its management or mismanagement in the custody of 
aid recipients, opportunity theory will help create awareness on the importance of the social 
context which is the governance environment where foreign aid will be allocated. 
5.7 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies 
Based on the limitation of adopting only the fixed effect regression analysis, future studies 
could utilize more than one statistical model to compare the results for validity and reliability 
especially to be able to provide more information as to the results that do not conform to the 
researcher’s expectations. Undoubtedly, available data for this study may have also limited the 
chances for more findings as foreign aid can be measured while also examining the kind of foreign 
aid donors and to see whether these findings will be same or different from the various foreign aid 
donors, be it bilateral or multilateral donors. It may appear that using GDP annual growth and 
health spending is not enough measures for development but these measures were selected based 
on availability of data across all countries of interest for this research. Most other development 
indicators for Sub-Saharan African countries from the data source have too many missing data and 
will end up not being a true representation for the Sub-Saharan African region. 
Also, to be able to fully ascertain if certain forms of foreign aid will lead to corruption, 
future research should explore testing various forms of foreign aid and not just one form of aid 
(infrastructural aid) as is the case of this study. Testing more than one form of foreign aid will 
provide a wide scope to investigate if certain forms of aid increases corruption and will allow for 
comparison between these forms of foreign aid. 
 In addition, future studies should explore the entire Africa and Asia instead of only the 
Sub-Saharan African countries. This will also help do a valuable comparison of its impacts on the 
different regions of the world and help to ascertain the possible reasons for or causes of those 
impacts and open rooms for more realistic policy discourse and recommendations.  
Lastly, future research should incorporate qualitative and demographic features like 
cultural orientation, value systems, worldviews25 etc. vis-à-vis foreign aid. This could be done with 
the use of primary data. It will help give a holistic perspective to the research- quantitative and 
qualitative. The research data and analysis adopted for this study does not in any way disprove 
other opinions about the role of foreign donors in the failure of recipient countries and 
underdevelopment. I intend to put into consideration the limitations of this study while also 
                                                 
25 There is also a growing body of work that examines this and can continue to be incorporated for future research. 
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incorporating the suggestions for future research at my doctoral level so as to account for more 
explanations of the interactions of foreign aid in its entirety, control of corruption, opportunity and 
development in Sub Saharan African nations. 
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APPENDIXES 
Figure One: Showing the Interacting Effect of Infrastructural Aid and Control of 
Corruption on Health Expenditure: 
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Figure Two: Showing the Interacting Effect of Total Aid and Control of Corruption on 
Health Expenditure: 
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